Thursday 30 April 2015

Omni-channel: castles in the sky?


By Paul Leyland, Founding Partner, Regulus Partners

“Neither Admiral Roland nor I claim to be omniscient or infallible – but we do claim to be omni-channel” - Where Eagles Dare 

(if it reflected modern gambling company boardrooms)


UK land-based gambling operators have historically struggled to convert their brand and retail footprint into material remote businesses. William Hill, the UK land-based group with the most successful remote business, rather proved the point by reversing online stagnation through a Joint Venture with Playtech and a wholesale detachment from UK retail operations. None of the other UK land-based businesses with significant market share in any licensing class makes the top six of UK remote operators by market share.

Fishing for an edge over multi-national remote operators, ‘multi-channel’ has been deployed as a buzzword / aspiration / article of faith for many land-based businesses for some time (the author remembers naively enthusing its imminent potential over a decade ago). Given the almost total failure of multi-channel strategies to convert into meaningful market share, it is perhaps unsurprising that the very term disappeared quietly and un-mourned from the catechism at some point late last year.

Omni-channel is now the the latest buzzword. It is expounded almost everywhere with the fervency of new hope; as if ‘omni-channel’ is somehow so radically different from ‘multi-channel’; that multi-channel was so last year and previous failures can be brushed aside; that the potential for land-based to deliver significant remote market share as part of a coordinated customer offer is now (really) shortly upon us.

I can understand why gambling wishes to deploy the lexicon (even the practices) of the wider retail market: omni-channel is not a gambling buzzword just as multi-channel was not. However, words to not change operations, much less make sales. My concern is not with the word, but with three underling problems its current use disguises:

1.       Many customers are already ‘omni-channel’ due to industry-wide supply changes
2.       The solution involves technology but it is not a technology solution
3.       Channel shift means the requirement is defensive rather than a growth opportunity

Operators are increasingly talking of giving their customers “an omni-channel experience”. It is certainly the case that the remote offer of most land-based businesses is more-or-less disconnected from the land-based in all but brand. However, does this matter to the customer? The customer can already bet ‘in venue, online and on the move’ and can choose from a wide range of operators in each category. Some customers may add remote gambling to their land-based activities because of in-venue promotion, but the vast majority who want to are likely to be doing it already.

For example, 54% of William Hill’s UK remote customers use shops while 34% of shop customers use online: this is without much ‘active’ omni-channel activity from the supply side. Certainly, there are a few benefits around the edges that a land-based business can (and should) provide over remote only (eg, integrated loyalty and CRM; cash-in/out; wallet) but these pale in comparison with being able to match the quality of other remote offers, which new remote customers soon discover and come to expect.

This quality has been historically lacking from land-based businesses’ remote offer, which is a key reason for multi-channel failure: the reason does not go away with a new name. The first pillar of omni-channel success must therefore be a remote product that can compete with the best in class in all products offered. The alternative is brand damage, operational failure, and, over time, loss of market share (see below).

All the major land-based businesses already have remote businesses. They tend to be on different platforms with limited product and CRM over-lap. This creates headaches for an omni-channel strategy and it is telling that the major technology providers are investing in omni-channel technology to overcome these hurdles. Technology is, of course, a key enabler for successful supply-led omni-channel (vs. already existing demand-led omni-channel) and suppliers will undoubtedly benefit from the push for omni-channel.

But, why should a customer be drawn to “brand A” online just because it has a land-based presence? And not just to visit the site and register (the brand works there, as evidenced by lower CPAs), but to successfully deposit (first point of failure), gamble and keep gambling (regular point of failure).

In the retail universe, where stock is tangible, the quality of the product is a key reason. However, in the gambling world much of the product is intangible and has been largely commoditised (with some important distinctions). In the remote world this is overcome with offers and lower margins; the land-based environment on the other hand answers the commoditisation problem by being determined to protect product margin and keep investment to an acceptable minimum.  These tensions of strategy rip apart any attempt at a common offer or user experience.

Another key reason for theoretical land-based edge is the ‘personal touch’ with the customer. With a few exceptions, the systematic quality of contact and service in most land-based gambling is beyond poor. That is not to denigrate staff: many do an amazing job of fostering loyalty through dedication and force of personality; but they tend to do it in isolation from employers, without consistency and with very few levers to cross-sell and/or up-sell.

The second pillar of successful omni-channel is therefore to improve levels of product and service across the board. Many remote-only customers would be shocked at the lack of value and investment in land-based; many land-based-only customers would be surprised (some dangerously pleasantly) at the offer (churn) driven remote model. These can be reconciled but it requires a real focus on customer service alongside understanding (and delivering) what the customer actually wants rather than what the industry think they want.

In my view customer service is far more important than technology for delivering successful omni-channel strategies and this is not something the sector has historically excelled at.

Successful omni-channel therefore requires significant investment in both the remote and land-based businesses; not just in technology but also in remote capabilities, retail infrastructure and people. Getting all of this right takes most land-based businesses far outside their areas of expertise and comfort. However, it is eminently achievable with a lot of hard work and focus on successful execution (not just buzzwords).

Nevertheless, there is a sting in the tail. Getting all of this right has historically promised growth. It now promises survival. As the statistics quoted on William Hill demonstrate, many customers are already omni-channel and each new cohort swings the dial further to remote.

According to our own figures, land-based gambling has barely grown in the last five years (2% CAGR, with many areas in decline), while remote has achieved a CAGR of 17%: channel-shift is occurring. Moreover, demographics, the ubiquity of mobile, the focus of marketing and investment, regulatory pressure, and the lack of meaningful R&D in the land-based sector means this trend is likely to accelerate.

What does this mean for land-based operators? In a nutshell guaranteed loss of market share in the “omni-industry”.

Historically this has been relative in a (relatively) stable landbased environment. However, in an environment where remote spend occurs instead of land-based spend, then a ‘typical’ landbased market share of c. 25% (of a given licensing class) gets converted into a ‘typical’ remote share of sub 10%: even the highly successful William Hill has a much higher LBO market share (30%) than remote (14%); for less successful multi-channel businesses, the conversion rate is much worse. 

Moreover, this is structural: even in a fully taxed and regulated regime, the remote channel can deliver more operators to a given customer than even the most competitive and diverse local landbased environment can ever hope too; further, land-based tools for building market share (rollout; M&A) do not work to anywhere the same extent in remote due to the lack of tangible space to control. To state the obvious, lower market share in a value transfer environment means lower revenue in absolute terms. And lower revenue in a high fixed-cost environment means rapidly declining profits.


Being omni-channel is not about promising growth. Nor is it about technology fixes. It is about re-engineering entire businesses to avoid medium-term extinction.

Thursday 2 April 2015

One day a prince will come….





An Innocent Man: Gordon Brown and the ‘killing’ of the super casino

By Dan Waugh, Partner, Regulus Partners

The great British super-casino whodunit is replete with enough twists, turns and intrigue to stand comparison with Agatha Christie’s best yarns. Not simply a tale of mistaken identity, it may also prove to be a case of a death faked; the perversion of the course of justice rather than homicide.

The ‘crime’ in this instance was the killing of the British super-casino (or ‘regional casino’ as it is known to legislation). The culprit, according to popular lore is that great pantomime villain, Gordon Brown, the conviction politician who brought his Presbyterian sense of morality to the question of how and where people in Britain should be permitted to gamble.  

At first glance, the facts fit. Under Blair our Britannia was cool – perhaps not Vegas cool but closer in spirit to the Rat Pack than to the Gang of Four. Blair gave Sir Alan Budd the freedom to review Britain’s gambling laws through the eyes of an economist rather than a moralist – and he decided as many other governments have done (including those to the left and to the right in Beijing and Singapore) that destination casinos or integrated resorts were good. Brown’s premiership was a correction to all that. It was back to basics (again) - a time for Labour to sober up after the party turned sour in Iraq and Afghanistan.

At the start of 2007 with Blair as PM, the Gambling Act (despite a tumultuous passage) had been in place for a year-and-a-half and we were on course for our first super-casino. By the end of the year, with Brown in Number 10, hopes for ‘Brit Vegas’ had been consigned to the dustbin. The ‘Son of the Manse’, cheered on by gambling’s bogeyman (and editor of the Daily Mail) Paul Dacre had prevailed by stopping Blair’s folly in its tracks.

Only it wasn’t quite like that…

According to voting records, Gordon Brown’s sole parliamentary involvement with the regional casino was an affirmative vote in March 2007, when the House of Commons endorsed the Casino Advisory Panel’s decision to award the licence to Manchester (along with the allocation to other local authorities of the eight ‘large’ and eight ‘small’ casino licences). I don’t know (and don’t particularly care) whether Brown’s conscience was troubled in voting for the measure. His vote was consistent with his priorities at the time (as boss of the Treasury) to attract investment to the UK.

The truth is that plans for integrated resorts and destination gaming were killed in the Lords and not in the Commons. In a monumental act of folly, Blackpool’s unsuccessful bid team persuaded a sufficient number of misty-eyed peers to form a united front with the anti-gambling lobby in order to defeat the statutory instrument.

Brown’s role in all of this was to persuade his culture secretary, Tessa Jowell to decouple the regional casino from the other 16 licences. His government probably could have pushed it through but Brown’s own interests had shifted with the move to Number 10. Rather than killing the super-casino, Brown’s role was to turn off the life-support machine.

Only it’s not quite like that either…

The intriguing fact behind all of this is that the regional casino isn’t dead after all. Look – it’s sitting right there in primary legislation – on the face of the Gambling Act. All that is required is the political will to resubmit the enabling legislation; and this is something that may not be as difficult as is commonly supposed.

If the decision to award the regional casino to Manchester was returned to Parliament, it is difficult to believe that Blackpool City Council would be sufficiently exercised to protest this time; while the backdrop of the FOBT controversy might even help to emphasise the virtues of destination gambling over the convenience market. Whoever wins the General Election in May will need to address the Budget deficit - and this will require investment ideas as well as simple tax-raising. Meanwhile, the opening of Genting’s Resorts World at the NEC will have helped to reframe thinking about how gambling can be harnessed to more productive economic ends.

What is really needed is not so much political will but industry ambition – for someone to paint a picture of what the regional casino (probably but not necessarily in Manchester) might look like – what amenities it would incorporate, how many jobs it would create, how much investment it would attract, how much it would generate in taxes, how it would support tourism and (importantly) explain convincingly how inevitable concerns about social responsibility can and will be effectively addressed.

This sense of ambition has not hitherto come from within the domestic industry, while many of the global titans of casino (such as MGM, Wynn, Las Vegas Sands and Crown) have bad memories of Britain as a place to do business. They may also be too besotted with the prospect of integrated resorts in Japan to bother about a return to our small island. And yet…..

And yet, Europe remains a major gambling market that the big operators have yet to crack. Investments in Britain by Genting, Crown and Caesars were effectively market entry plays and remain fairly marginal in terms of their global businesses. Meanwhile, Sands may now ‘own’ the customer in most of the major gambling markets in the world – Las Vegas, Macau, Singapore – but not in Europe.

There was a time when some very bright minds (in government, in academe, in industry) considered that destination casinos would work in Britain and work for Britain. It may not be in vogue to say so today but that is no reason to disregard their considered work on the subject.

The super casino is not dead; it is simply sleeping. It pricked its finger on a spinning wheel and now waits for Prince Charming (Prince Steve, Prince Sheldon, Prince Jim, perhaps even a homespun Prince….) to bring it back to life.

Meanwhile, as he prepares to retire from life in the Commons, we should pause to exonerate Gordon Brown for the crime of killing our super casino and perhaps remember him instead as the man whose betting tax changes (GPT) responded to sound economic arguments and paved the way for a rebirth of that sector….


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